4
of air forces based on Hong Kong, but here there was doubt as to whether the construction of an air base at Hong Kong was permissible under article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty; and, in any case, the provision of an aerodrome presented difficulty owing to the absence of any suitable site. Given sufficient time for prepara- tion, the necessary troops and the acquiescence of the other foreign Powers, it might be possible to capture Canton.
Our Canton policy, therefore, from the outset, had to be guided by two considerations (a) assistance from other foreign Powers would be at the best half- hearted, and (b) isolated military action was almost out of the question. We had to adopt a policy of inaction. This seems to have surprised the Canton Governmen At least, according to the "Morning Post" of the 26th January, 1926 :—
་
Immediately after the Shameen shooting incidents, when ill-feeling was at its highest, the Canton Government expected to be attacked, and have now admitted they had made all plans to retire into the country, leaving the city in cccupation of foreign troops. They would then have raised the banner of hatred from north to south and embroiled every nation in the quarrel. This scheme. which probably emanated from Soviet influence, was foiled by our inaction."
However, on learning that the Cantonese were strengthening the forts at the mouth of the river, His Majesty's Admiralty despatched the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Hermes to Hong Kong, so as to make sure that communications with Shameen could not be interrupted. H.M.S. Hermes arrived at Hong Kong on the 10th August.
44
The question of Soviet support to anti-British agitations in China generally. and in Canton in particular, had at once received the careful attention of the Foreign Office. There can be no doubt whatever that both the Third Communist Inter- national and the Soviet Government are deeply implicated in the agitation in China, that they have supported such agitation with large supplies of money, arms and munitions, and that they have deliberately directed this agitation in an anti-British channel. The question of counter-action to be taken by ourselves at Moscow in order to secure a cessation of these activities was fully investigated at the end of June.
It was then decided that diplomatic action (e.g., withdrawal of recognition from Russia) could not be taken on the sole initiative of His Majesty's Governmeш, though we would be ready to consider any initiative from Japan, the United States of America or France on these lines. Our general feeling (see Annex I) was thot Bolshevism was its own most effective enemy and would eventually discredit itself in China, as it has done elsewhere. To launch a general attack against the Bolsheviks would exaggerate the importance of their enmity and thus would help to prolong their influence.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of July, the new Canton Government was formed. It consisted chiefly of Kuomintang elements, and it opened its career with grandiloquent manifesto, announcing that Canton had been under the economic and political domination of Hong Kong, but that a new era of independence and municipal improvement was at hand (see Annex X). It was not until August that the extremists gained complete control at Canton, and throughout July an eventual settlement seemed not impossible. The boycott of "imperialist "goods and shipping i continued, with great loss, especially to the colony of Hong Kong. In August steps were taken to confine the boycott to British and Japanese goods only.
On the 13th August. His Majesty's consul-general at Canton telegraphed (Canton telegram No. 10) that three new Navigation Rules" had been published by the Canton Government :-
1. Steamers of any nationality except British and Japanese are allowed to ply
between various ports provided they do not call at Hong Kong.
2. On entering ports, all vessels must be subject to inspection of labour picket-
of the anti-Imperialist Union,
3. Exports of food-stuffs and raw materials prohibited.
• Government consisted of Hsu Chung-chih (Minister of War); Hu Aan-min (Minister for Foreign Affairs); Liao Chung-k'ai (Minister of Finance); George Hau-chien (Minister of Justice). Besides the Government, a regular committee for general affairs was elected consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Es Chung-chih, Tan Yen-kai, Bu Han-min and Lin Sen. Liao Chung-k'a (a violent Communist) was assassinated towards the end of August; and, shortly after Liao's death, Hu Han-min found Canton too hot for bio and left on a political mission to Moscow. C. C. Wu has been (and is) head of the municipality, but he assists In the direction of foreign affairs in co-operation with Borodin.
Sir J. Jamieson has recently (Canton telegram No. 5 of the 2nd February, 1926) paid an unex pected tribute to this extreme Kuomintang Government, as "the best Kwangtung has ever had."
5
His Majesty's consul-general suggested that the maritime treaty Powers thus dictated to should immediately institute a blockade at the entrance to the river, which could easily be effected. On the 16th August, the Commodore at Hong Kong telegraphed that a blockade would prevent the importation of munitions of war which had been arriving freely in Canton lately (mostly from Russian sources) and might bring about the overthrow of Bolshevik elements at Canton through popular indignation or otherwise force an issue (Canton telegram No. 11). About the same time, the French Government were suggesting a naval demonstration at Canton.
On the 20th August, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking telegraphed (Peking telegram No. 322) that as the "Navigation Rules" affected all Powers having ships plying to Canton, he suggested that co-operation of all the Powers concerned would be advisable if the blockade were decided on. At the same time, he did not feel that such an action was either necessary or advisable, or that it would bring about the downfall of the Communist Canton Government. He added that in the opinion of His Majesty's consul-general nothing short of abrogation of the treaties would placate the local Government and end the strike.
On the 22nd August, the Foreign Office suggested to Peking (telegram to Peking No. 214) the following course of action which should be taken jointly by the Powers: That the attention of the Chinese Government should be drawn to the unjustifiable regulations issued by the Canton authorities in breach of treaty rights, together with a warning that, unless the Chinese Government could secure their withdrawal within a specified time limit, the Powers would be obliged to take further measures; but it was also suggested that if this action further united the Chinese against us, the game might not be worth the candle.
His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied (Peking telegram No. 329) that according to the Japanese consul at Canton the "Navigation Rules" had been issued merely for effect and were not intended to be enforced, and that consequently neither the Japanese Minister nor himself were making any formal protest at present to the Chinese Government, who, besides, professed ignorance of the whole matter. Further the Japanese Minister had expressed some apprehension at newspaper reports as to the intransigent attitude of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed his opinion that British business circles were inclined to take too alarmist and exaggerated a view of the whole matter, which did not seem to have developed far enough for so drastic a step as a blockade. In any case, he said, Japanese co-operation was essential, since their shipping was bracketed with ours, and American co-operation highly desirable. He considered that isolated British action would be fatal, and that a joint warning by the British, American and Japanese Governments, with as many others as would join, would certainly be Leneficial if it became necessary.
4
At the same time, His Majesty's consul-general at Canton reported that the Canton Government had informed him that they had neither published nor approved the Navigation Rules" (Canton telegram No. 16). Technically, this may be true, as it has since become manifest that the rules are published and enforced by the strike committees; but at that date (the end of August) the standing and power of the strike committees were by no means so clear as they are now. In any case, the Japanese assurance that these rules were published merely for effect has not turned out to be true-except perhaps as regards Japanese shipping. The rules are the backbone of the anti-British boycott, and have been most strenuously enforced.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had received a series of appeals from British firms and from such representative bodies as the China Association and the Imperial Merchant Service Guild, asking for "action" as regards Canton, The Colonial Office enquired as to our attitude. and passed on strongly-worded resolutions from the Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, which demanded an immediate ultimatum to Canton followed by strong action. Both British and Chinese interests at Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Government itself impressed upon us that they were threatened with immediate ruin. These enquiries were answered on the following lines:-
"Mr. Chamberlain doubts whether a blockade would do more than provide anti-British propaganda in Canton and the rest of China, but any more drastic action than a blockade he is certain would have a most unfortunate reaction. It must be remembered, too, that we are bound by the Washington China Treaty to full and friendly communication with other Powers concerned before taking any steps affecting the sovereignty and independence of China. Any
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